Abstract. We study a strategic game where every node of a graph is owned by a player who has to choose a color. A player's payoff is 0 if at least one neighbor selected the same color, otherwise it is the number of players who selected the same color. The social cost of a state is defined as the number of distinct colors that the players use. It is ideally equal to the chromatic number of the graph but it can substantially deviate because every player cares about his own payoff, whatever how bad the social cost is. Following a previous work done by Panagopoulou and Spirakis [15] on the Nash equilibria of the coloring game, we give worst case bounds on the social cost of stable states. Our main contribution is an improved (tight) bound for the worst case social cost of a Nash equilibrium, and the study of strong equilibria, their existence and how far they are from social optima.
Introduction
We study a vertex coloring game is defined as follows: given a simple graph G = (V, E), each vertex is a player who has to choose (deterministically) one color out of n = |V |. A player's payoff is 0 if he selects the same color as one of his neighbors, otherwise it is the number of vertices with same color.
Panagopoulou and Spirakis [15] introduced the game and studied its set of pure strategy Nash equilibria, denoted by P N E(G). Nash equilibria (NE in short) are sustainable and rational states of the game. Interestingly, P N E(G) is nonempty for every graph G and there exists a polynomial time procedure to compute an element of P N E(G) [15] . However Nash equilibria are known to deviate from a socially optimal state in many situations (e.g. the prisoner's dilemma). The social cost associated with a graph G and a strategy profile σ, denoted by SC(G, σ), is defined as the number of distinct colors selected by the players. Panagopoulou and Spirakis give upper bounds on SC(G, σ) when σ ∈ P N E(G). These bounds depend on several parameters of the graph and often match known bounds on the chromatic number of G.
We continue the work done by Panagopoulou and Spirakis [15] and give improved bounds on SC(G, σ) when σ ∈ P N E(G). We also study the set of pure strong equilibria of the vertex coloring game, denoted by P SE(G). A strong equilibrium (SE in short) [3] is a state where no unilateral deviation by a non empty coalition of players is profitable to all its members. This solution concept refines the pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and it is more sustainable. In this paper we mainly show that a strong equilibrium always exists but it is NP-hard to compute one. In addition we provide upper bounds on the social cost SC(G, σ) when σ ∈ P SE(G).
Previous work and contribution
The vertex coloring problem is a central optimization problem in graph theory (see for instance [11, 12] ) and several games defined upon it exist in the literature. Bodlaender [5] study a 2-player game where, given a graph, an ordering on the set of vertices, and a finite set of colors C, the players alternatively assign a color c ∈ C to the uncolored vertex that comes first in the ordering, and such that two neighbors have distinct colors. Bodlaender considers several variants of the game (e.g. a player looses if he cannot move) and focuses on the existence of a winning strategy.
In [7] Chaudhuri, Chung and Jamall study a coloring game defined by a set of available colors and a graph G = (V, E) where each node represents a player. The game is played in rounds; each round, the players choose a color simultaneously. A player's payoff is 0 if one of his neighbors uses the same color, and 1 otherwise. The main result in [7] is that for a coloring game played on a network on n vertices with maximum degree ∆, if the number of colors available to each vertex is ∆+ 2 or more, and if each player plays a simple greedy strategy, then the coloring game converges in O(log n) steps with high probability. The game adressed by Chaudhuri, Chung and Jamall was initiated by Kearns, Suri and Montfort [10] who performed an experimental study. A possible motivation of the game is a scenario where faculty members wish to schedule classes in a limited number of classrooms, and must avoid conflicts with other faculty members [10] .
The coloring game studied by Panagopoulou and Spirakis [15] and the game introduced by Kearns et al [10, 7] mainly differ in the definition of a player's payoff. In [15] a player gets 0 if one of his neighbors selects the same color, otherwise his payoff is the number of players using the same color. The other difference is that n colors are available to each node. This paper is mainly dedicated to this model (an edge coloring game is also investigated). The motivation given in [15] is the analysis of a local search algorithm for the vertex coloring problem with provably good worst case distance of local optima to global optima. Interestingly they choose to illustrate their results via a game-theoretic analysis where local optima correspond to the Nash equilibria of the coloring game. Nevertheless the coloring game has applications in selfish routing in particular networks [8, 1, 9, 4] where every player has to choose a facility (i.e. a wavelength, a time-slot, etc) that is not used by another player with which he is incompatible. Then most results in [15] are seen as bounds on the loss of efficiency in stable states of a strategic game, and it is the topic of many papers since the seminal papers [14] and [16] .
Panagopoulou and Spirakis [15] prove that every NE of the vertex coloring game is a feasible, and locally optimum, vertex coloring of G. It is noteworthy that a feasible coloring (in particular a social optimum) is not necessarily a NE. However at least one social optimum of the vertex coloring game is a NE. As we will see later, this property does not hold for strong equilibria. It is also shown in [15] that a Nash equilibrium σ of the vertex coloring game on a graph G = (V, E) satisfies:
where n = |V |, ω(G) is the clique number of G (maximum size of a clique), m = |E|, α(G) is the stability number of G (maximum size of a stable set),
We separate the bounds given in (1) into three groups according to the dominant parameter: (a) ∆ 2 (G), (b) n and (c) m. Hence, we obtain (a)
. It is not difficult to prove that the bounds given in (a) and (b) are tight for every value of
Since a NE must be a social optimum if the following (independent) cases: ∆ 2 (G) = 1, ω(G) ≤ 1 and α(G) = 1, we will always assume χ(G) ≥ 2 (the case χ(G) = 1 corresponds to ω(G) = 0). However the bound (c) is not sharp as we will see in Theorem 2.
In this article, we first deal with NE in Section 3. We propose a graph characterization of NE and, based on this characterization, we propose tight bounds depending on m and χ(G) for the number of colors used in a NE, improving the one of [15] . Then, we show that the situation greatly improves in trees, since in this case the number of colors in a NE is only logarithmic.
In Section 4, we study SE in the same spirit: we propose a graph characterization and show almost tight bounds on the number of colors used in a SE. This allows us to derive that the strong price of anarchy, the worst case value of SC(G, σ)/χ(G) for σ ∈ P SE(G), is logarithmic.
We conclude this article in Section 5 by some additional results dealing with k-strong equilibria (strong equilibria for coalition of size a most k) for the vertex coloring game, new payoff functions that can alleviate the social cost and an edge coloring game (the same game up to the fact that we want to color the edges of the input graph).
Due to space limitations, some proofs are omitted.
Notations and definitions
Graph Theory We use standard notations in graph theory. A stable set is a subset of pairwise non adjacent vertices. A stable set S is maximal if, for every vertex x ∈ V \ S, S ∪ {x} is not a stable set. The stability number α(G) is the maximum size of a stable set. A coloring is a partition of V into stable sets S = (S 1 , . . . , S q ). The chromatic number χ(G) is the minimum size of a coloring. It is well known (see for instance [6] ) that
Strategic games A strategic game Γ is a tuple N, (Σ i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N where N is the set of players and Σ i is the strategy set of player i. Each player i has to choose a strategy in Σ i . Then × i∈N Σ i is the set of all possible pure states (or strategy profiles) of the game. We only study pure strategy states, so we often omit the word "pure". u i : × i∈N Σ i → R is the utility function of player i (the higher the better). σ i denotes the strategy of player i in the strategy profile σ ∈ × i∈N Σ i . For a subset of players N ⊂ N , σ N (resp., σ −N ) refers to σ, restricted to (resp., without) the strategies of N . Hence, given two states σ and σ, σ = (σ −N , σ N ) denotes the state where
We often use the following abusive notations: σ i and σ −i instead of σ {i} and σ −{i} respectively. Finally σ = (σ −i , j) denotes the state where σ i = j and σ i = σ i for every i = i. A state σ is a pure Nash equilibrium (NE in short) if for any i ∈ N and any strategy j
Hence no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from a NE. A strategy profile σ is a strong equilibrium if for every non empty subset of players S and every assignment σ , at least one player i ∈ S satisfies u i (σ −S , σ S ) ≤ u i (σ). In other words, any joint deviation by a coalition can not be profitable to all its members. A k-strong equilibrium is defined similarly for coalitions involving at most k players. In particular, Nash equilibria and strong equilibria are respectively 1-strong and |N |-strong equilibria.
The social cost of a strategy profile σ for the game Γ is a real number which characterizes how costly to the whole set of players σ is. It is denoted by SC(Γ, σ) (we will sometimes omit Γ if not necessary). Hence the social cost is minimized for some states called social optima.
The price of anarchy (PoA) [14] for pure Nash equilibria is defined as the worst case value of max σ∈P N E(Γ ) SC(Γ, σ)/SC(Γ, σ * ), over all instances of the game, where P N E(Γ ) is the set of all pure NE of Γ and σ * is a social optimum. The PoA captures the lack of coordination between independent players. The strong price of anarchy (SPoA) [2] is defined similarly, just replace P N E(Γ ) by P SE(Γ ) (the set of all pure strategy strong equilibria of Γ ) in the previous definition.
The vertex coloring game The vertex coloring game is a strategic game where N = V and Σ i = {1, · · · , n} for all i. The utility of player i in σ is
Let P N E(G) (resp., P SE(G)) be the set of all pure Nash equilibria (resp., pure strong Nash equilibria) of the vertex coloring game for a simple graph G. It is known that P N E(G) = ∅ but, up to our knowledge, nothing is known about the existence of a strong equilibrium.
Given a simple graph G = (V, E), a social optimum of the vertex coloring game is an optimal coloring. Hence, the optimal social cost is the chromatic number χ(G).
We always assume that |S 1 (σ)| ≥ · · · ≥ |S q (σ)| and for any j = 1, . . . , q, f σ (j) denotes a player with strategy j in σ (if one exists). Then by definition we have: Property 1. For any NE σ of a simple graph G, the following (in)equalities hold:
Nash equilibria
We propose a graph-characterization of the Nash equilibria of the vertex coloring game which will be useful in the following. Given a coloring S = (S 1 , . . . , S q ) where |S 1 | ≥ · · · ≥ |S q |, the mapping g (depending on S) from {1, . . . , q} to {1, . . . , q} is defined as g(j) = min{i : |S i | = |S j |}. For instance, we get g(1) = 1 and if the stable sets of S have distinct sizes, then g(j) = j. Theorem 1. Let G = (V, E) be a simple graph. The state σ is a NE of G for the vertex coloring game iff for every i = 1, . . . , q the stable set
Proof. Consider a simple graph G = (V, E), instance of the vertex coloring game. Let σ be a NE with corresponding coloring S(σ) = (S 1 (σ), . . . , S q (σ)). Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and consider a player j ∈ S k for some k ≥ g(i), k = i. Since |S i (σ)| = |S g(i) (σ)| ≥ |S k (σ)|, the fact that player j does not want to deviate to set S i (σ) implies that j is adjacent to some vertex in S i (σ). Then we deduce that S i (σ) is a stable set maximal in G g(i) .
Conversely, let S = (S 1 , . . . , S q ) be a coloring of G with |S 1 | ≥ · · · ≥ |S q | and such that S i is a stable set maximal in G g(i) . Consider the state σ where player j ∈ S i plays strategy σ j = i (thus, S i (σ) = S i ) and assume by contradiction that σ is not a NE. This means that there is a player j ∈ S i who can unilaterally replace his strategy by k such that u j (σ −j , k) > u j (σ). Hence, we deduce that S k ∪ {j} is a stable set of G and |S k | ≥ |S i |. We obtain a contradiction, since on the one hand g(k) ≤ k ≤ i and on the other hand S k (σ) is supposed to be a stable set maximal in G g(k) .
Using Theorem 1, we can improve the bound of the PoA given in [15] according to the parameter m (see inequalities (1) and (c)).
Theorem 2. For simple graphs G on m edges with chromatic number χ(G) ≥ 2, the social cost of a NE σ verifies:
This bound is tight for any χ(G) ≥ 2 and arbitrarily large m.
Proof. Consider a simple graph G = (V, E) on m edges and with chromatic number χ(G) ≥ 2, instance of the vertex coloring game. Let σ be a NE with corresponding coloring S(σ) = (S 1 (σ) , . . . , S q (σ)) and social cost SC(G, σ) = q. We suppose that q ≥ χ(G) + 1 since otherwise P oA = 1.
Actually, since the p i stable sets of size i of S(σ) are also maximal in
where |S j (σ)| = i and Theorem 1), there are at least
, leading to the conclusion that there are at least i(q − + p 1 (q − p 1 ). In fact, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} one can check that we have:
j=1 p j . Thus, the inequality follows by induction. Finally, observe that we get: p 1 + p 2 = q by construction and p 1 ≤ ω(G) ≤ χ(G) ≤ q − 1 since G 1 is a clique from Theorem 1 (thus, p 1 = ω(G 1 ) ≤ ω(G), q ≥ χ(G) + 1 by hypothesis and χ(G) ≥ ω(G) from inequality (2)). Hence, we deduce:
In fact, the mapping z(x) = q 2 +
2 ) − q (see second line in the above inequalities with x = p 1 ) is decreasing for
Hence, we obtain SC(G, σ) ≤ χ(G)+1 2 + m − (χ(G) + 1)(χ(G) − 1)/4 and the inequality (3) follows. Tight examples exist but they are not given due to the limitation of pages.
For instance, for connected bipartite graphs with m ≥ 1 edges we obtain
which is an improvement on the bound given in [15] . Theorem 2 states that the bound of is tight in bipartite graphs (the lower bound is obtained with a bipartite graph). To conclude this section, we tackle the problem when the graph G is a tree and show that the social cost drops significantly: from 3/2 + m − 3/4 in bipartite graphs to log(n) + 1. This bound being tight, we obtain as a conclusion that the PoA in trees is log(n)+1 2 .
Theorem 3. In trees, the social cost of a NE is at most log(n) + 1. This bound is tight for arbitrarily large n.
Strong equilibria
First of all, note that when studying strong equilibria, we can restrict ourselves to coalitions where all the players of the coalition choose the same color (in their new strategy) since any coalition S for this game can be decomposed into several coalitions S i which group the players that switch to the same color. Moreover, the coalition S is improving (i.e., the utility of each member of the coalition increases) iff each coalition S i is improving. As a consequence, we only need to consider coalitions of size at most α(G).
For SE, we can state a graph-characterization similar to Theorem 1, by replacing "maximal stable set" by "maximum stable set". Actually, we do not need the mapping g anymore.
Theorem 4. Let G = (V, E) be a simple graph. The state σ is a SE of G for the vertex coloring game iff for every i = 1, . . . , q, for every j ∈ S i (σ), we get u j (σ) = α(G i ) where G i is the subgraph of G induced by S i (σ) ∪ · · · ∪ S q (σ).
In particular, Theorem 4 gives a proof of the existence of SE and a procedure to find it. On the other hand, it also shows that finding a SE within polynomial time is impossible unless P=NP. Corollary 1. Finding a SE of the vertex coloring game is NP-hard.
Note that we will tackle in Section 5.1 the case of k-strong equilibra, i.e. strong equilibria restricted to coalitions of size at most k. We will show in particular that for k = 2, 3, finding such an equilibrium is polynomial, while the problem is left open for k ≥ 4.
When the chromatic number is one, that is when G contains no edge, the PoA (and then the SPoA) of the vertex coloring game is 1. Thus, we focus on graphs G with χ(G) ≥ 2. In [15] it is shown that at least one optimal coloring is a NE. For the strong equilibrium, it is not the case. Proposition 1. For every k ≥ 2, there are some graphs with chromatic number k where no optimal coloring is a SE.
Proof. For any k ≥ 2, consider the following split graph G k = (K k , S 2k ; E k ) on 3k vertices where K k = {x 1 , . . . , x k } is a clique of size k and S 2k = {y 1 , z 1 , . . . , y k , z k } is a stable set of size 2k. Moreover, each vertex x i ∈ K k is linked to 2 vertices y i , z i ∈ S 2k . See Figure 1 for an example of graphs G 2 and G 3 . Clearly, S 2k is the only maximum stable set of G k . Indeed, a stable set of G k has at most one vertex of K k since K k is a clique and if a stable set has one such a vertex, then it has at most 2k − 2 vertices of S 2k . Thus, using Theorem 4, the strategy profile σ defined by σ i = 1 if v i ∈ S 2k and σ xj = 1 + j for j = 1, . . . , k, is the only SE using k + 1 colors. On the other hand, χ(
Now, we study the SPoA of the vertex coloring game according to parameters ∆ 2 (G), n or m. From inequality (1), we deduce that P oA ≤
for graphs with chromatic number χ(G) and P oA ≤
for general (non trivial) graphs. Actually, as a corollary of Proposition 2 (see below), we deduce that this bound is tight for χ(G) = 2 and for any value ∆ 2 (G) ≥ 2. More precisely, we prove that according to the parameter ∆ 2 (G), the SPoA and the PoA of the vertex coloring game are equal.
Proposition 2. The social cost of a SE of the vertex coloring game is at most ∆ 2 (G) + 1 for simple bipartite graphs G on n vertices. This bound is tight even if we consider the class of trees and arbitrarily large values of ∆ 2 (G).
However, note that Proposition 2 does not imply that in trees every NE are SE. For instance in the P 2k+1 (the induced path on n = 2k + 1 vertices), from Theorem 4 it is easy to prove that there is only one SE corresponding to the optimal coloring (i.e., SP oA(P 2k+1 ) = 1 for any k ≥ 1). On the other hand, in the P 6k+1 on vertex set {1, . . . , 6k + 1} for every k ≥ 1, the state σ defined by σ 3i+1 = 1 for i = 0, . . . , 2k, σ 3i+2 = 2 and σ 3i+3 = 3 for i = 0, . . . , 2k − 1, is a NE using 3 colors (and then, it is not a SE). Now, we analyze the SPoA of the vertex coloring game according to the parameter n (the number of vertices). In [15] , it is indicated that unless NP⊆co-RP, the PoA of the vertex coloring game is at least n 1−ε for simple graphs on n vertices and for every ε ∈ (0; 1). Here, we prove that the SPoA of the vertex coloring game is much better. In trees, we already know that the SPoA is exactly (1 + log(n))/2. We prove in the following that this bound of O(log n) is in fact also an upper bound for the SPoA of the vertex coloring game in general graphs.
Theorem 5. The social cost of a SE in the vertex coloring game is at most χ(G)− 1 + log a n χ(G)−1 where a = χ(G) χ(G)−1 for any simple graph G on n vertices with chromatic number χ(G) ≥ 2.
Consequently, considering graphs of n vertices, the SPoA is at most ln(n) + o(ln(n)).
Since in a simple graphs on n vertices there are m ≤ n(n − 1)/2 edges, we deduce from Theorem 5 that the SPoA is at most 2 ln(m) + o(ln(m)). From the lower bound in trees, we also get that in (connected) graphs on m edges the SPoA is at least log(m)/2 + o(log(m)).
Using Theorem 5 and the lower bound in trees, we deduce that the SPoA of the vertex coloring game equals 1 2 log n + 1 2 in bipartite graphs on n vertices. It is a notable improvement relatively to the PoA since it is noticed in [15] that the PoA at least Dealing with the bound of Theorem 5 depending on both χ(G) and n, we can produce a lower bound which is not tight but closed to being so.
Proposition 3. For any χ(G) ≥ 2, there are some simple graphs G on n vertices admitting a SE with social cost at least 1 + (χ(G) − 1) log χ n.
Final results and concluding remarks

k-strong equilibria
In Sections 3 and 4, we provided a characterization of NE and SE respectively. A natural question is to provide such a characterization for k-Strong equilibria, a solution concept which is in between NE and SE. We answer this question by giving a slightly more complex characterization.
Given a coloring S = (S 1 , · · · , S q ) (sorted in non increasing size order), let us define for any j = 1, · · · , q and for any i ≤ j the graphG i,j as the subgraph of G induced by S i ∪ S i+1 ∪ . . . ∪ S j . Let us also remind that G j is the subgraph of G induced by S j (σ) ∪ · · · ∪ S q (σ) and g(j) is the smallest index i such that
Theorem 6. Let G = (V, E) be a simple graph. The state σ corresponding to a coloring S = (S 1 , · · · , S q ) is a k-SE of G for the vertex coloring game iff for every j = 1, . . . , q we have the following conditions:
-For any i < j such that |S i | ≤ |S j | + k − 1, the size of a maximum stable set containing S j inG i,j is at most |S i |;
Note that all the items given in the characterization can be tested in polynomial time provided that k is a fixed constant. Now, we prove that starting from a feasible coloring, computing a 3-strong equilibrium can be done in O(n 3 ) steps, each step corresponding to an improvement for a coalition of at most 3 players. So, computing a k-strong equilibrium for k = 1, 2, 3 can be done in polynomial time. For k = 1, the result was already known from [15] since the authors proved that a NE (i.e., a 1-strong equilibrium) can be found in O(nα(G)) steps. Actually, we believe that the result holds for any constant k ≥ 1, but we are not able to prove this. Proposition 4. A 3-strong equilibrium of the vertex coloring game can be computed in polynomial time.
Proposition 4 is proved via a potential function argument, i.e. one can assign a real positive value to every state that is O(n 3 ). Interestingly enough, it can be shown that a similar approach would not work for coalitions of size at most k, where k ≥ 4. Indeed, in this case the weight associated to an independent set of size i has to be exponential in i.
Alleviating the social cost with a new utility function
In the model of Kearns et al [10, 7] a player's payoff is 0 if one of his neighbors uses the same color and 1 otherwise. Then a player is satisfied if he is in an independent set, whatever how large the set is. With social cost considerations in mind (and supposing that an unbounded number of colors is available), this payoff function would be very expensive (n actually). In the model of Panagopoulou and Spirakis [15] , the players are incentivized to be in a large independent set because their payoff grows with the size of their set. As we have seen this payoff function ensures better bounds on the social cost (compared to previous the model).
An interesting question would be to provide a different utility function in order to improve the global efficiency of the system 1 . Trying to overcome the limits of the adopted utility function, we propose the following one. Instead of considering the size of a stable set, we consider the number of edges incident to a stable set. Formally, given a simple graph G = (V, E) and a strategy profile σ, the utility of player i in σ now becomes u i (σ) = vj :σj =σi d(v j ) if {v j : σ j = σ i } is a stable set and 0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that the characterization of a SE is the same for this new utility function: instead of considering maximum stable set, we just have to consider maximum weight stable set, where the weight of a stable set is the sum of the degree of the vertices it contains. More precisely, a state σ corresponding to a coloring S(σ) = (S 1 (σ), · · · , S q (σ)) (the sets being in non decreasing weight order) is a SE iff for any i S i (σ) is a maximum weight stable set in G i .
Using this utility function, we get a simple but nice result for bipartite graphs.
Proposition 5. Using the above utility function, any SE is an optimum coloring in bipartite graphs.
This is a nice improvement compared to the bound of θ(log(n)) for the initial utility function. Unfortunately, this does not generalize as soon as χ(G) ≥ 3.
Proposition 6. Using the above utility function, the SPoA is at least (log(n/3) +1)/3 in 3-colorable graphs.
In our opinion, finding a utility function that alleviates the social cost is an interesting question that deserves further research.
An edge coloring game
The edge coloring problem on a simple graph G = (V, E) can be viewed as the vertex coloring problem on L(G) where L(G) is the line graph of G (each edge e i ∈ E becomes a vertex x i of L(G) and there is an edge [x i , x j ] in L(G) if e i and e j are adjacent in G). Here, for simplicity, we refer to the edge model. Thus, an edge coloring M = (M 1 , . . . , M q ) of a simple graph G = (V, E) is a partition of E into matchings M i . The minimum number of matchings partitioning the edges of G is called chromatic index of G and is denoted by χ i (G). It is well known that the chromatic index of any simple graph G of maximum degree ∆(G) verifies:
Hence, the edge coloring game is the vertex coloring game on line graphs. In particular, Theorems 1 and 4 are valid when we replace vertex coloring S(σ) = (S 1 (σ), . . . , S q (σ)) by edge coloring M(σ) = (M 1 (σ), . . . , M q (σ)). Also, G i becomes the partial subgraph of G induced by M i (σ) ∪ · · · ∪ M q (σ). However, now computing a SE of the edge coloring game is polynomial (using the characterization of Theorem 4) since it consists of finding inductively a maximum matching of the current graph which is polynomial [6] . Finally, we always assume that ∆(G) ≥ 2 since otherwise SC(G, σ) = χ i (G) for every NE σ of the edge coloring game for graphs G with ∆(G) = 1. On the other hand, if we restrict ourselves to regular bipartite graphs, any SE is a social optimum for the edge coloring game. 
